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Abstract 
The focus of this paper is on spatial market integration in agricultural land markets. We 
scrutinize the applicability of the law of one price to land markets and distinguish between 
absolute and relative versions of this “law”. Panel data unit root and stationarity tests are 
applied to land sale prices in the German state Lower Saxony. Three main clusters with 
different price developments are detected. Our results indicate that the law of one price holds 
only locally due to structural differences among regions.  
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1 Introduction 
Recent spikes in food prices and the high liquidity on international financial markets have 
boosted the demand for land. As a result, agricultural land prices have steadily increased over 
the past decade in many parts of the world. These developments have triggered a debate on 
whether current legislation is still appropriate or whether there is a need for revision. 
Arguments in this debate address all dimensions of sustainability, i.e., economic, social, and 
environmental aspects. The controversy about land ownership is reflected by the debate on 
land grabbing (e.g., Deininger et al., 2010), which is usually associated with developing 
countries; however, van der Ploeg et al. (2015) point out that the new land rush also affects 
the global North and the EU. Deininger (2003) argues that unequal distribution of land is 
behind social unrest and political conflicts that are prevalent in many rural areas around the 
world. 
Against this background, demand for stricter regulations of land markets is articulated. Apart 
from increasing land prices, policy makers and other stakeholders are concerned about an 
“unsound” or “unfair” concentration of land property rights. As a response, various measures 
have been proposed to address the aforementioned objectives, e.g., giving farmers priority in 
case of land purchases or relieving young farmers’ access to land by facilitating farm 
succession and start-ups. At the same time, market access for agents treating land as an 
investment asset without an interest in farming, so-called non-agricultural or financial 
investors, should be restricted.1 Restricting the transfer of capital shares of agricultural 
cooperatives (“share deals”) to such investors has been suggested on a regulatory basis  
since these deals bypass the current legislation in Germany (Land Transaction Act, 
Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz). Similar discussions about the necessity of tightening land 
market regulations also take place at the EU-level (Kay et al., 2015). This demonstrates the 
international dimension and broad relevance of the problem. 
From an economic viewpoint, land market regulations that go beyond a general institutional 
framework ensuring functioning markets, such as defined property rights, should fulfil two 
preconditions. First, a (potential) market failure exists that may lead to economically and/or 
socially inferior land market outcomes. Second, envisaged regulations are supposed to lead to 
superior results. Actually, policy makers and stakeholder groups, such as farmers, often refer 
to market failures when justifying the need for policy interventions. Thus, we want to explore 
if empirical evidence of failures in agricultural land markets exists. In a first approach to this 
topic, we refer to the notion of market efficiency. Land market efficiency can be considered 
from at least two perspectives. The first approach focuses on the relation between land sale 
prices and land rental prices, and tests the validity of the present value model of land prices 
(e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2007). Test results can be used to identify the presence of speculative 
bubbles or boom and bust cycles in land markets (Falk, 1991). The relationship between land 
sale prices and land rental prices, however, is more complicated than presumed by simple 
present value models (Turvey et al., 2003). The second approach is to study market efficiency 
                                                          
1  Notably, the European Court of Justice recently decided that the denial of land sale contracts due to 
overcharged prices in public land auctions should not be considered as a means of state subsidization. This is 
seen as being particularly true if the winning bid is considered to be of a “speculative nature”. 
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using the concept of spatial market integration. If markets are integrated, the law of one price 
(LOP) holds, that is, price differences of homogenous products or factors in spatially 
separated markets should not exceed transportation costs and other transaction costs; 
otherwise, arbitrage opportunities would exist (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). 
The general objective of this paper is to investigate the efficiency of agricultural land markets 
via spatial market integration. According to the LOP, all goods on integrated markets are sold 
at the same price, apart from transportation or transaction costs. While the concept of spatial 
market integration has been extensively applied to agricultural product markets (e.g., Barrett 
and Li, 2002) and agricultural labour markets (Richards and Patterson, 1998), applications to 
land markets are rare. This may arise from special characteristics of the production factor 
“land”. First, land is an extremely heterogeneous asset, which complicates price comparisons. 
Spreen et al. (2007) have shown that the non-homogeneity of goods can lead to a false 
rejection of the LOP. Second, land is immobile and hence it is not obvious how trade and 
arbitrage processes will actually work. Compared with other markets, transaction costs are 
high (Shiha and Chavas, 1995). As a result, the convergence of land prices will take place 
much more slowly, if at all, and markets may appear separated though they are spatially 
integrated. Finally, and related to the second point, regional market power may exist that 
prevents land prices in different regions from convergence. Thus, transaction costs should be 
interpreted in a broader sense and also cover costs related to asymmetric information due to 
the market structure, such as price agreements among neighbours or unequal access to 
subsidies, leading to market imperfections (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). However, despite of 
these peculiarities, Waights (2014) emphasizes that the LOP, in general, also applies to real 
estate prices. This is due to the fact that farmers and capital are mobile. 
The contribution of our paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, this is one of the first 
attempts to examine the spatial market integration of agricultural land markets empirically. By 
investigating the spatio-temporal behaviour of land prices, we enhance the scope of spatial 
econometric models that are commonly used for hedonic land price studies. Second, we test 
the applicability of statistical tools that have been developed for commodity markets in the 
context of land markets. The work closest to our paper is a study by Carmona and Rosés 
(2012) that investigates the spatial integration of Spanish land markets between 1904 and 
1934. Apart from the different contextual setting, their analysis is based on aggregated data 
and does not take into account heterogeneity of land characteristics in the price series that 
may bias the test results. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
econometric methodologies used in this study, particularly how to test for the (local) validity 
of the LOP with stationarity tests; Section 3 describes the study area and available dataset, as 
well as the necessary price adjustments and choice of a benchmark region; Section 4 presents 
and interprets the results of the empirical application; Section 5 provides final conclusions and 
a discussion of the limitations of the study.  
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2 Methodology 
According to the (relative) LOP, land prices in two regions should differ only by transaction 
costs and quality differences in the long-run, i.e., 
 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the log prices of land in region 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡, respectively. 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 
denote transaction costs and product quality differences, respectively. The absolute version of 
the LOP requires the price differential to be zero, but in the short-run, stochastic deviations 
from this relationship may occur. However, if quality adjusted price differences exceed 
transaction costs, arbitrage processes will be triggered and pull back relative land prices to 
their long-run equilibrium relationship. This implies that the difference of (log) prices is 
stationary under the LOP given that transaction costs are stationary. Thus, the long-run 
equilibrium (1) can be tested by the following empirical model with a first-order 
autoregressive component: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 is the long-run equilibrium relationship and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the region-specific constant that 
accounts for initial price differences as well as quality differences and transaction costs from 
Eq. (1). 
To test whether the process in Eq. (3) is stationary, unit root tests can be conducted.2 The low 
power of univariate unit root tests has been improved by the development of panel unit root 
tests (e.g., Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003). Whereas the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test assumes 
a common 𝛽𝛽 for all regions 𝑖𝑖, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test allows for region-specific 
convergence rates 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖. To mitigate the serial correlation of the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, Im et al. (2003) 
rewrite Eq. (3) with additional lags of the dependent variable as the following: 
 
∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−k + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where the term ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1 ∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−k captures the short-run dynamics of the land price process. 
The speed of convergence is reflected by the size of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖. If the coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is smaller than 
zero, relative land prices follow a stationary process. In that case, shocks are temporary and 
∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 converges to a constant value so that the LOP holds. If Eq. (3) has a unit root, i.e., 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0, then ∆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is non-stationary and the two land markets are separated. In the context of 
commodity markets, this finding is usually interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency.  
  
                                                          
2  Besides the unit root test, the methods of co-integration and error-correction have also been used in the LOP 
literature. Since some of our price series are not integrated of order one, we do not consider the co-integration 
analysis in this case. 
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Another important criterion for the selection of the appropriate test is the composition of the 
error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. If the individual time series in the panel are cross-sectionally independent, the 
IPS test is adequate. In the presence of cross-sectional dependence, however, the IPS test 
results will be biased. To cope with cross-sectional dependence, Pesaran (2007) suggests a 
CIPS test based on the following regression:  
 
∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=0
∆𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖 + �𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−k + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
Eq. (4) augments the individual regressions in Eq. (3) by the cross-sectional average  
𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1  and the lagged differences, ∆𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖, ∆𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖−1, … ,∆𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖−p. Since in the case of 
cross-sectional independence the CIPS test has lower power than the IPS test, we apply the 
cross-sectional dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004) to test for the presence of cross-
sectional dependence and hence to choose the most appropriate panel unit root test.3  
Though panel unit root tests increase the statistical power of univariate unit root tests, they are 
still not very powerful with respect to the alternative hypothesis of stationarity, i.e., the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity may not be rejected even if prices are slowly converging. To 
increase the reliability of our testing procedure, we combine the (C)IPS test with a stationarity 
test, the Hadri Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Hadri, 2000), which is an extension of the 
univariate stationarity test by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS test) to panel data. The data 
generating process that underlies the Hadri test is given by: 
 ∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random walk, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 denotes fixed effects and individual 
trends, and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are zero-mean i.i.d. normal errors across 𝑖𝑖 and over time 𝑡𝑡. The null 
hypothesis is given by H0: 𝜆𝜆 = 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2⁄ = 0 with 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2 being the variances of 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, respectively. The null hypothesis corresponds to ∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 being stationary because in the 
case of 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 = 0, the random walk 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 reduces to a constant. Hence, a non-rejection of H0 will 
be interpreted as evidence for the LOP.  
On real estate markets, there exists the phenomenon of so-called “convergence clubs” (Abbott 
and De Vita, 2013). Convergence clubs enclose regions that share similar price dynamics and 
show diminishing price differences in the long-run. This concept has been introduced because 
one can rarely expect that the LOP holds for an entire country. Nevertheless, land prices in 
sub-regions with similar economic conditions may converge. In other words, testing the LOP 
in land markets does not only imply a decision on a single hypothesis as in commodity 
markets. Instead, it involves a more complex procedure targeting the identification of 
homogenous regions that show a long-run equilibrium relationship. To this end, we follow the 
Sequential Panel Selection Method (SPSM) (Chortareas and Kapetanios, 2009), which carries 
                                                          
3  Note that more general error structures have been suggested in the literatures. For instance, Pesaran et al. 
(2013) extend Eq. (4) to a multifactor error structure model by incorporating unobserved factors into the error 
term. 
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out a sequence of panel unit root tests on panels of decreasing size. Adapted to our context, 
the procedure involves the following steps (see Figure 1): 
Figure 1.  Flow chart of the procedure for testing price convergence 
 
 
1) The basis of the sequential detection of convergence clubs are log prices of 𝑁𝑁 counties, 
which were adjusted for differences in average soil quality. These price series are then 
sorted according to the test statistic of univariate KPSS stationarity tests. The county with 
the minimum value of the KPSS statistic, i.e., the county with the highest probability of 
being stationary, is chosen as the benchmark region to calculate relative prices. 
Alternative benchmarks will follow later.  
2) The resulting panel of relative adjusted log prices of 𝑁𝑁′ = 𝑁𝑁 − 1 counties (one county is 
the benchmark) is tested for stationarity by the Hadri test. If the null hypothesis of 
stationarity is rejected (i.e., we do not have overall convergence), the county with the 
maximum KPSS test statistic of univariate KPSS tests of the relative prices is removed. 
This county has the highest probability of being non-stationary and the highest 
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contribution to the rejection of the Hadri test – a test which is a panel version of univariate 
KPSS tests.  
3) This results in a subpanel of 𝑁𝑁′ − 1 counties is tested again for stationarity by the Hadri 
test. If the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected again, the county with the second-
highest KPSS test statistic is removed as well. This procedure is repeated 𝑘𝑘 times until the 
Hadri test cannot anymore reject the null hypothesis of the subpanel being stationary. 
4) The remaining subpanel of 𝑁𝑁′ − 𝑘𝑘 counties (stationary according to the Hadri test) is then 
tested for a unit root using a (C)IPS test to confirm the result of the Hadri test using 
opposite hypotheses. If the (C)IPS test cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit roots, the 
county with the highest chance of having a unit root is removed. This county is 
determined by performing univariate (C)ADF unit root tests and choosing the one with the 
highest test probability. The univariate (C)ADF tests form the basis for the panel (C)IPS 
unit root tests. This procedure is repeated 𝑗𝑗 times until the (C)IPS rejects the null 
hypothesis of unit roots. 
5) The remaining subpanel of 𝑁𝑁′ − 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑗𝑗 counties and the benchmark form a homogenous 
region with price convergence and therefore market integration (Solakoglu and Goodwin, 
2005). 
As mentioned before, this procedure is then repeated for other benchmarks. After having 
chosen the county with the minimum value of the KPSS statistic of absolute log prices as the 
benchmark in the first place, we now take the one with the maximum value. This county 
shows the clearest non-stationary development and is supposed to form the basis of another 
convergence club. For this purpose, the relative prices of all counties that were not assigned to 
the first homogenous region are calculated with respect to the new benchmark. Then, the 
composition of the second convergence club is derived according to Figure 1. After detecting 
two “extreme” convergence clubs, we take the middle one of the remaining counties, sorted 
by the KPSS statistic of absolute log prices, as a third benchmark. Repeating the selection 
procedure leads to a third convergence club whose development stands between the other two. 
Theoretically, this procedure might be continued until all counties are assigned to a 
convergence club, but we limit the number of clubs to the three aforementioned ones to 
simplify their interpretation. Please note that the method for how we constructed the 
convergence clubs guarantees that each county is assigned to at most one club. 
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3 Study area and data 
3.1 Study area Lower Saxony 
Lower Saxony is located in northwest Germany and consists of 37 counties.4 It is the second 
largest state in Germany covering an area of 47,600 square kilometres. About 60 % of this 
area is used for agricultural production. In terms of production value, Lower Saxony is one of 
the leading states, contributing more than 20 % to Germany’s revenues from agriculture. 
However, natural conditions, production structures, and farm size structures differ largely 
across regions within Lower Saxony. In fact, Lower Saxony reflects much of the diversity of 
agrarian production that can be found in Germany. Roughly, four agrarian zones can be 
distinguished in Lower Saxony. The former administrative districts Hannover and Brunswick, 
located in the Eastern and South-Eastern part of Lower Saxony, respectively, are 
characterized by fertile soils. In this region, farms are rather large and specialized in cash 
crops and have a livestock density of less than 0.5 livestock units (LSU) per hectare. The 
former district Lüneburg breaks down into two agrarian zones: a southern part with poor soil 
quality that hosts mainly large specialized potato producers and a northern coastal part with a 
large share of pasture land. The latter region is dominated by dairy production, but also has a 
large pomiculture cluster. The distinguishing feature of the fourth agricultural zone, Weser-
Ems in the western part of Lower Saxony, is its intensive livestock production. In view of 
rather poor soil quality and relatively small farm sizes, livestock production shows 
comparative advantages and its intensity has steadily increased over the last few decades. 
Actually, 70 % of Lower Saxony’s hog production and more than 80 % of its poultry 
production is concentrated in this region. More recently, biogas production became an 
important alternative business in this region. Currently, 50 % of Lower Saxony’s total 
agricultural revenues are generated in the Weser-Ems region. 
The aforementioned facts document the heterogeneity of agricultural production within Lower 
Saxony. Since natural and economic conditions have an impact on the productivity of land, 
we expect that differences in land use intensity translate into differences in land rental and 
sales prices. 
3.2 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on sale prices of arable land on a county level in Lower 
Saxony. These data are available for 25 years (1990–2014) and 37 counties5 of Lower 
Saxony, provided by the Statistical Office of Lower Saxony. This results in a balanced panel 
data set of 925 annual observations. Besides the annual average price of arable land in €/ha 
for each county, the data set also contains the number of transactions, the average soil quality 
of the sold lots as a yield index (Ertragsmesszahl), and the total area of transacted land in ha. 
                                                          
4  In November 2016, the two counties Göttingen and Osterode am Harz were merged, so that Lower Saxony 
now consists of 37 counties. In the period relevant for this study, however, the total number of counties is 38. 
5  Data for sales of arable land in the county Wesermarsch were not available. Moreover, the eight cities in 
Lower Saxony are excluded from the analysis. 
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This aforementioned conjecture of different land prices due to different economic conditions 
is confirmed by Figure 2, which displays the development of (nominal) land prices for Lower 
Saxony as a whole and for the three counties representing different price dynamics within this 
state (these counties will be the benchmarks later). We observe a boom in prices in Osnabrück 
(from 18,816 €/ha in 1990 to 55,827 €/ha in 2014, +179%) and a moderate increase in 
Heidekreis (from 10,565 €/ha to 19,186 €/ha, +82%), whereas prices in Hildesheim increased 
slightly (from 25,483 €/ha to 33,596 €/ha, +32%). Not only has the price level differed 
significantly across counties, but also has the appreciation of land values.  
Figure 2.  Prices for arable land in Lower Saxony and the three selected counties 
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Figure 3 displays the spatial distribution of prices in 2014. It can be seen that the prices in the 
counties in the western part of Lower Saxony are generally higher, which corresponds to this 
area’s aforementioned high livestock production. The maximum price is observed in Vechta 
(83,798 €/ha) in the western region and the minimum price in Lüchow-Dannenberg 
(14,731 €/ha) in the far eastern part of the state. This huge difference cannot be explained by 
differences in average soil qualities, which are moderate for Vechta (2014: 39 points6) and 
Lüchow-Dannenberg (2014: 33 points) compared to other counties (in 2014, the minimum is 
28 points in Rotenburg (Wümme) and the maximum is 71 points in Hildesheim and 
Wolfenbüttel).  
Figure 3.  Regional distribution of land prices (€/ha) in Lower Saxony (2014) 
 
 
                                                          
6  The soil quality is denoted by an official index in Germany. The lowest measured value is 7 points, the 
highest 104 points. 
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In Figure 4, the price development over the years 1990–2014 is shown. We observe that the 
largest increase occurred in the western part of Lower Saxony, whereas the eastern and 
southern parts experienced comparatively moderate growth (except for Osterode am Harz). 
The maximum price increase occurred in Emsland (+301%) in the far western part of the state 
and the minimum in Helmstedt (+0.05%) in the far eastern part of the state. This diverse 
development also cannot be traced back to effects from the average soil quality, which 
stagnates over the years. The soil quality of single plots does not change over the years, but 
the average soil quality slightly fluctuates depending on the soil quality of lots sold in one 
year.  
These three figures already illustrate the large regional differences in Lower Saxony and raise 
considerable doubts about the validity of the LOP for the whole of Lower Saxony. 
Figure 4.  Change in land prices (%) within Lower Saxony (1990-2014) 
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3.3 Price adjustment 
One prerequisite for the validity of the LOP is the homogeneity of the analysed good. Land, 
however, is rather heterogeneous. In our analysis, a large degree of heterogeneity is already 
taken out since we apply average prices per county provided by the statistical office: The 
statistical office already excluded unusual transactions of land to prepare representative values 
and the values on the county level reduce heterogeneity compared to transaction data. One of 
the most important factors of land prices, the soil quality of the sold plots, however, still 
varies over the counties, which is shown by the numbers reported above. Furthermore, within 
a county, soil quality can vary over time depending on the quality of the single plots sold in 
different years. Without an adjustment for soil quality, the absolute LOP cannot be assumed 
to hold. 
A standard approach to analyse the LOP for heterogeneous good is to run a hedonic price 
regression first to correct for different characteristics (Danzon and Chao, 2000; Goldberg and 
Verboven, 2005, 2004; Lutz, 2004; Waights, 2014). For our dataset, we consider the 
following regression model assuming a constant effect of soil quality and a county-specific 
linear trend: 
 ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (6) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average sale price of arable land in county 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 denotes individual 
effects, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the county-specific and time-dependent soil quality, 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 captures a linear time 
trend, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a stochastic error term. The individual effects and the county specific time 
trends are included to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. If the estimated coefficient 𝛿𝛿 of 
the soil quality is found to be statistically significant, we will use it to correct for the effect of 
the soil quality for all counties and years with the following equation:  
 (ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ = ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖) (7) 
where (ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ denotes the adjusted log prices that correspond to the average yearly soil 
quality ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖 and form the basis of the convergence tests. 
Before the convergence tests, we examine whether counties with low initial land prices tend 
to experience faster growth rates. The presence of such convergence has been routinely tested 
by regressing the growth rate of land prices over the sample period on the initial level of 
prices. A negative value of the slope coefficient in the regression model can be interpreted as 
evidence of convergence (e.g., Kim and Rous, 2012). Figure 5 illustrates the relationship 
between initial log land prices and growth rates of land prices for 37 counties in Lower 
Saxony. If all land prices were converging over time, the scatter plot would show a strong 
negative relationship between the initial price level and the subsequent growth rate. However, 
we find that there is little evidence of a systematic relationship. In the absence of a regional 
catch-up in the long-run price, there is no sign for ultimate convergence among the 37 
counties and hence little chance for the validity of the absolute LOP.  
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Figure 5.  Growth of land prices for Lower Saxony 
 
 
3.4 Choice of benchmark 
After the log prices are now adjusted for soil quality, the other issue is the choice of a 
benchmark. Previous researchers noticed that convergence results are possibly sensitive to the 
choice of the benchmark unit (Abbott and De Vita, 2013; Cecchetti et al., 2002; Goldberg and 
Verboven, 2005; Solakoglu and Goodwin, 2005; Parsley and Wei, 1996). One way to address 
this criticism is to use more than one benchmark. Alternatively, the pairwise approach can be 
applied, which performs pairwise univariate tests instead of panel tests (Abbott and De Vita, 
2013; Pesaran et al., 2009). To avoid the lower power of univariate tests, we still utilize the 
panel approach and choose the benchmark based on stationarity tests of the individual series. 
As described in Section 2, we take the counties with the extreme KPSS test statistics as well 
as one intermediate county to represent different development trends. The county with the 
lowest KPSS test statistic and hence the highest probability to be stationary is Hildesheim, 
whereas the highest KPSS test statistic is obtained for Osnabrück. For the county with an 
intermediate value, we chose Heidekreis. The development of the raw prices of these counties 
was already depicted in Figure 2. These counties reflect three different development paths in 
Lower Saxony and hence are well-suited as benchmarks. 
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The variables entering the panel convergence tests are the adjusted log prices in relation to an 
overall benchmark, denoted as ∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and defined in the following way:  
 ∆𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ − (ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ (8) 
This means that the adjusted log prices of all counties 𝑖𝑖, (ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ are considered with respect 
to the adjusted log prices in the benchmark region, (ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′.  
4 Results 
The first step of the testing procedure comprises of an adjustment of heterogeneous prices for 
differences in soil. The results of the hedonic regression are shown in Table 1. Time and 
county effects are significant in most counties and the statistically significant coefficient of 
soil quality has the expected positive sign, i.e., higher soil quality generally leads to higher 
prices. Hence, we adjust the log prices according to Eq. (7). 
To determine the appropriate panel unit test (IPS or CIPS), we first test for the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence (CD). We apply the CD test first for the adjusted log prices 
without a benchmark and then for the adjusted log prices relative to the three benchmark 
regions (Hildesheim, Heidekreis, and Osnabrück). Irrespective of analysing absolute or 
relative prices, there is substantial cross-sectional dependence according to the CD test. We 
control for this cross-sectional dependence by using the CIPS test, which we explain below. 
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Table 1.  Estimation results in the hedonic price regression 
 County individual effects 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊 County-specific linear trend 𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Ammerland 8.97986*** 0.154889 0.03067*** 0.010497 
Aurich 8.66796*** 0.144272 0.02077*** 0.009371 
Celle 8.74722*** 0.120739 0.02305*** 0.007998 
Cloppenburg 9.40705*** 0.103596 0.04295*** 0.006884 
Cuxhaven 8.68736*** 0.120151 0.02880*** 0.007806 
Diepholz 8.87388*** 0.111122 0.04319*** 0.007274 
Emsland 9.26305*** 0.093255 0.04691*** 0.006175 
Friesland 8.64023*** 0.219825 0.03866*** 0.014567 
Gifhorn 8.55072*** 0.101241 0.02883*** 0.006653 
Goslar 9.05717*** 0.150787 0.00940 0.009550 
Göttingen 8.82707*** 0.103015 0.01445** 0.005988 
Grafschaft Bentheim 9.46632*** 0.086438 0.03740*** 0.005721 
Hameln-Pyrmont 9.14437*** 0.091964 0.00995** 0.004786 
Harburg 8.72687*** 0.109501 0.03202*** 0.007159 
Heidekreis 8.61602*** 0.124432 0.02414*** 0.008361 
Helmstedt 8.86524*** 0.100503 0.00751 0.005602 
Hildesheim 9.32893*** 0.123930 0.00620 0.006874 
Holzminden 8.80871*** 0.131821 0.00912 0.008254 
Leer 8.82896*** 0.226152 0.03322** 0.015371 
Lüchow-Dannenberg 8.37876*** 0.168423 0.02449** 0.011407 
Lüneburg 8.50781*** 0.136002 0.02357*** 0.009097 
Nienburg  8.76049*** 0.110449 0.03051*** 0.007162 
Northeim 8.79433*** 0.119097 0.01234* 0.007100 
Oldenburg 9.11845*** 0.125488 0.04208*** 0.008405 
Osnabrück 9.33493*** 0.082862 0.03681*** 0.005020 
Osterholz 9.04297*** 0.154694 0.01454 0.010447 
Osterode am Harz 8.20960*** 0.156981 0.02521** 0.010323 
Peine 9.29983*** 0.114955 0.01583** 0.006758 
Region Hannover 9.43232*** 0.094119 0.01097** 0.005400 
Rotenburg  8.65245*** 0.138449 0.03707*** 0.009382 
Schaumburg 9.19908*** 0.085983 0.00833** 0.004137 
Stade 8.70516*** 0.116281 0.03792*** 0.007575 
Uelzen 8.74916*** 0.117546 0.02220*** 0.007678 
Vechta 9.62015*** 0.112970 0.03729*** 0.007419 
Verden 8.76282*** 0.105352 0.02929*** 0.006823 
Wittmund 8.52196*** 0.182220 0.03971*** 0.012264 
Wolfenbüttel 9.03579*** 0.125609 0.01438** 0.007118 
Soil quality effects 𝛿𝛿 0.01018*** 0.00094   
Number of observations 925    
Wald 𝜒𝜒2 1051753    
Prob. > 𝜒𝜒2 0.000    
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
We begin by analysing the convergence of land prices among all 37 counties. Visual 
inspection of the individual price series in Figure 2 suggests that at least some counties within 
Lower Saxony exhibit different price dynamics. This conjecture is confirmed by a Hadri test 
(Table 2) 
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Table 2.  p-values of cross-sectional dependence test and convergence tests 
Test Benchmark region 
 Hildesheim Heidekreis Osnabrück 
CD 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
All counties    
Hadri 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CIPS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Homogeneous sub-regions    
Hadri 0.0524 0.0734 0.0657 
CIPS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The Hadri test rejects the null hypothesis of price convergence irrespective of the chosen 
benchmark region if all counties are included in the panel. On the other hand, a CIPS test 
clearly rejects the null hypothesis that all (relative) land price series are nonstationary. Thus, 
we can conclude that the LOP does not hold for land prices in Lower Saxony as a whole, but 
may hold for some sub-regions. To identify these sub-regions, we carry out the SPSM 
described in the previous section. By means of this approach, we are able to identify three 
“convergence clubs”. The first consists of five counties, namely Hildesheim, Goslar, 
Helmstedt, Hannover, and Holzminden. A common feature of these counties is the stationarity 
of their (log) land prices according to a univariate KPSS test. In these counties, we observe 
only a slight increase in land prices within the last two decades, despite the overall land price 
boom in Germany. Hence, we designate this group as a “stagnating” convergence club. The 
lower panel of Table 2 shows that the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected by a 
Hadri test at the 5% significance level, whereas the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is 
rejected by a CIPS test.  
Figure 6 reveals that most members of the stagnating group are located in south east Lower 
Saxony and form a regional cluster. Note that counties that are merged in this cluster may 
show rather unequal land price levels. Figure 3 reveals that in the benchmark region 
Hildesheim, land prices are considerably higher, for example, than in Helmstedt (33,596 €/ha 
versus 17,909 €/ha in 2014). However, this difference does not contradict the outcome of the 
convergence tests. First, price levels become more similar after adjusting for differences in 
soil quality: For example, the adjusted prices in Hildesheim and Helmstedt in 2014 are 
18,327 €/ha and 13,577 €/ha, respectively, after adjusting for a soil quality of 71 points in 
Hildesheim and of 52 points in Helmstedt. Both prices are adjusted to a soil quality of 44 
points, which is the average soil quality for all counties in 2014. Even more important is the 
fact that stationarity refers to the land price ratio rather than to absolute price differentials. 
That is, membership in one convergence club implies that land prices grow (or shrink) with a 
similar rate. This does not rule out divergence in absolute price levels. 
To investigate convergence among the remaining 32 counties that exhibit non-stationary land 
prices, we choose Osnabrück as a benchmark region because the hypothesis of stationarity is 
rejected with the highest probability according to the KPSS test. Applying the SPSM 
identifies 14 counties which share a similar price development with Osnabrück: Diepholz, 
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Harburg, Rotenburg, Stade, Ammerland, Aurich, Cloppenburg, Friesland, Bentheim, Leer, 
Oldenburg, Vechta, and Wittmund. These counties are characterised by a significant boom in 
land prices during the last decade of the observation period. It is noteworthy that this 
convergence club forms two regional clusters with different natural conditions and production 
systems (Figure 6). One cluster is located in the mid-western part of Lower Saxony (in the 
Weser-Ems region) and covers an area of intensive livestock production.  
Figure 6.  Convergence clubs 
 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 document that the highest land prices within Lower Saxony are in this 
region. Moreover, the price increase over the last two decades is rather pronounced. This 
reflects the high marginal productivity of land that can be typically realized in labour and 
capital intensive production systems, such as pig and poultry farming. Tightening 
environmental regulations, particularly limiting the disposal of manure, have further increased 
the scarcity of land in this region. The second cluster is located in the north-eastern part of 
 Testing for Regional Convergence of Agricultural Land Prices 17 
SiAg-Working Paper 20 (2017); HU Berlin 
this state which is dominated by dairy farms operating on grassland. Land price levels are 
considerably lower than in the Weser-Ems region. Again, we find that counties showing 
different absolute land price levels are collected in one convergence club. The heterogeneity 
of the club members suggests that different economic factors may have caused the observed 
land price boom, such as increased environmental regulations, the liberalization of the EU 
milk market, or urban sprawl (e.g., around the city of Osnabrück). 
A final iteration of the SPSM carves out a third convergence club that is comprised of 
10 counties: Gifhorn, Osterode, Nienburg, Celle, Cuxhaven, Lüchow-Dannenberg, Lüneburg, 
Verden, Uelzen, and Heidekreis. The latter county was chosen as a benchmark for this group 
because it ranks in the middle of the residual counties according to the KPSS test statistic. 
The evolution of land prices in this convergence club range between those of the stagnating 
and the booming group, i.e., land prices are characterised by a moderate increase. Most 
counties are located in the eastern part of Lower Saxony. Figure 6 further shows that the 
SPSM cannot assign all counties to one of the three convergence clubs. In total, eight counties 
(Göttingen, Emsland, Hameln-Pyrmont, Northeim, Schaumburg, Osterholz, Peine, and 
Wolfenbüttel) do not belong to any of the three groups. With the exception of Osterholz and 
Emsland, these counties are concentrated in the south of the state, i.e., adjacent to the 
stagnating convergence club. Regarding Emsland, it is puzzling why this county is not a 
member of the booming convergence club since it shares many characteristics with 
neighbouring counties, such as Vechta and Cloppenburg. A closer look at the land price 
dynamics in this county, however, reveals that the price increase during the observation 
period is even higher than in the benchmark county Osnabrück, so that its price ratio appears 
to be nonstationary. 
It is important to note that the exact classification of counties into one of the three 
convergence clubs depends on a few of parameters that have to be specified by the researcher. 
First and foremost, the classification result depends on the choice of the benchmark county. 
Our idea was to determine two counties with extreme values of the KPSS test statistics as the 
benchmark for the stagnating and the booming convergence club. Choosing counties with less 
extreme KPSS values changes the size and the composition of the resulting groups slightly. 
Second, the order in which the counties are successively removed from the set of non-
classified counties depends on the KPSS test statistic in our procedure. However, this way of 
ordering is not unique and other rankings lead to feasible solutions as well. Finally, the 
significance level of the Hadri test, at which the stationarity hypothesis is rejected, has an 
effect on the group size. Since the identification of the convergence clubs follows an iterative 
procedure, changes in one convergence club may have an influence on the structure of other 
clubs as well. Though changes in the aforementioned parameters have an impact on the exact 
composition of the convergence clubs, the qualitative results of our analysis are rather robust. 
Table 3 provides further information on the outcome of the testing procedure that is useful to 
characterize the price dynamics in the three convergence clubs. For each county, OLS 
estimates of the coefficients 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 in Eq. (3) are presented. From these estimates, half-
lives given by − ln 2 / ln(1 + 𝛽𝛽) can be derived, i.e., the time period in which half of the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium relationship between a specific region and the 
benchmark region will be eliminated.  
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The last column of Table 3 displays the deviation of the long-run adjusted land price level of a 
county relative to the benchmark region, which follows from the relationship −αi/βi. In line 
with the outcome of the panel unit root tests and stationarity tests, all estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 have 
negative values. These estimates are not significant for only three counties in the booming 
region. Note that for seven counties, estimated convergence rates are smaller than -1, which 
means that land prices in these counties fluctuate around the price level of the benchmark 
region. In general, the convergence rates are rather large in absolute values and translate into 
half-lives shorter than one year. The price adjustment is rather fast compared to agricultural 
commodity markets, where half-lives usually vary between three and five years (e.g., 
Cecchetti et al., 2002; Nagayasu and Inakura, 2009; Seong et al., 2006; Sonora, 2005). 
However, our results are in line with findings in Carmona and Rosés (2012), who report half-
lives of less than one year for the Spanish land market in the previous century.  
Table 3. Characterisation of convergence clubs 
Convergence 
clubs Counties 𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊 𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊 
Half-
lives 
Long-run relative 
price deviation from 
the benchmark  
Stagnating 
counties 
(benchmark 
Hildesheim) 
Goslar -1.1231*** -0.245*** - -19.6% 
Helmstedt -0.8378*** -0.390*** 0,381 -37.2% 
Hannover -0.8144***  0.135*** 0.412  18.0% 
Holzminden -1.1834*** -0.578*** - -38.7% 
Moderately 
increasing 
counties  
(benchmark 
Heidekreis) 
Gifhorn -0.7117***  0.019 0.557  2.7% 
Osterode -0.9268*** -0.334*** 0.265 -30.3% 
Nienburg -1.2099***  0.287*** -  26.8% 
Celle -0.8745*** -1.239*** 0.334 -75.7% 
Cuxhaven -1.2388***  0.176*** -  15.3% 
Lüchow-Dannenberg -1.4112*** -0.312*** - -19.8% 
Lüneburg -0.8023*** -0.060 0.428 -7.2% 
Verden -1.1829***  0.285*** -  27.2% 
Uelzen -0.7711***  0.095** 0.470  13.1% 
Booming  
counties 
(benchmark 
Osnabrück) 
Diepholz -0.2124 -0.083 2.902 -32.3% 
Harburg -0.7689*** -0.520*** 0.473 -49.2% 
Rotenburg -0.3079 -0.211* 1.883 -49.7% 
Stade -0.8225*** -0.512*** 0.401 -46.4% 
Ammerland -0.5526* -0.201** 0.862 -30.4% 
Cloppenburg -0.3974  0.056* 1.369  15.1% 
Friesland -0.6847** -0.489*** 0.600 -51.0% 
Grafschaft Bentheim -0.9463***  0.132*** 0.237  15.0% 
Leer -0.9348*** -0.543*** 0.254 -44.0% 
Oldenburg -0.5338* -0.084* 0.908 -14.6% 
Vechta -1.0981***  0.298*** -  31.2% 
Wittmund -0.6938* -0.552*** 0.586 -54.9% 
Aurich -0.4080* -0.334** 1.322 -55.9% 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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The fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 capture time-invariant factors that go beyond differences in soil quality, 
for which land prices have been corrected. We find that these county-specific effects are 
significant for most counties, implying that the price difference between a specific county and 
the benchmark county converges towards a nonzero constant. In other words, the absolute 
version of the LOP does not hold for the majority of all counties, even if differences in soil 
quality are taken into account. The long-run price differential can be of considerable size and 
ranges between -75.5% and 31.2%. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining how to measure market efficiency and 
market integration empirically in the case of agricultural land markets. This paper uses 
standard methods of commodity market analysis to investigate spatial integration on 
agricultural land markets. Spatial market integration techniques allow the analysis of spatio-
temporal behaviour of land prices and go beyond standard analyses with spatial econometric 
models. A combination of panel unit root tests and panel stationarity tests is applied to a time 
series of land prices in 37 counties in Lower Saxony. The test procedures clearly reject the 
prevalence of the LOP for Lower Saxony as a whole, even in its relative version and after 
adjusting for soil quality differences. Nevertheless, we are able to identify regions that exhibit 
similar land price dynamics in a sense that the relative prices of included counties are 
stationary and converge toward a constant. These regions, which we term convergence clubs 
following the real estate literature, are to some extent composed of neighbouring counties that 
have similar natural and socioeconomic conditions, but may also comprise of rather unequal 
counties exhibiting the same price dynamics, albeit for different reasons. Membership in a 
convergence club implies that land prices co-move and do not drift apart; it does not mean 
that differences in absolute price levels vanish over time. While the exact composition of the 
convergence clubs can vary with the choice of the benchmark region, the qualitative results of 
our study are robust. 
The finding that the LOP does not hold for agricultural land markets even on a state level 
should not instantaneously be interpreted as an indicator of land market inefficiency that calls 
for policy intervention and market regulation. Slow convergence of prices may simply reflect 
the immobility and heterogeneity of this production factor. Even temporal price divergence 
can be rationalized in a competitive market environment, similar to real estate markets where 
house prices drift apart between urban and rural areas. In fact, the ‘new economic geography’ 
asserts that clustering forces, such as economies of scale and knowledge spillovers, can foster 
the concentration of economic activities in space, which, in turn, can cause disparities of 
factor prices in different regions (Fujita et al., 1999; Fingelton, 2009). In this setting, high 
land prices constitute a centrifugal force, counteracting the further concentration of intensive 
agricultural production, which otherwise may come along with negative environmental 
effects. 
This paper is only a first step towards a comprehensive understanding of the spatio-temporal 
behaviour of agricultural land prices and there are several directions for extending our 
20 Xinyue Yang, Matthias Ritter, and Martin Odening 
SiAg-Working Paper 20 (2017); HU Berlin 
analysis. First, it would be relevant to examine the impact of regional scale on the outcome of 
the clustering procedure. Due to data availability, our study was based on counties, i.e., 
administrative entities that include rather heterogeneous socioeconomic areas. A finer 
regional resolution will likely ease the identification of homogeneous convergence clubs. 
Second, from a methodological perspective, it would be desirable to increase the robustness of 
the classification results with respect to the choice of the benchmark regions. Abbott and De 
Vita (2013) bypass this problem through testing pairwise convergence across all regional 
combinations. Moreover, the stability of the empirical results could be cross-checked by 
applying alternative testing procedures, such as t-convergence tests (Phillips and Sul, 2007). 
Finally, our study focuses on the measurement of land price convergence, but is rather silent 
about the underlying economic determinants. Thus, a direction for further research is the 
identification of common factors, such as land rental prices, interest rates, or farm exit rates 
that drive the development of land prices within convergence clubs. 
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